Argentine Monetary Unit

The Argentine gold coin from 1875 was the gold peso fuerte, one and two-thirds of a gram of gold of fineness 900, equivalent to one and a half grams of fine gold, defined by Law no. 733 of 1875. This unit was based on that recommended by the European Congress of Economists in Paris in 1867 and adopted by Japan in 1873 (the Argentine 5 peso fuerte coin was equivalent to the Japanese 5 yen).[5]

argentine monetary unit

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The system before 1881 has been described as "monetary anarchism" (anarquía monetaria).[5] Law no. 1130 of 1881 put an end to this; it established the monetary unit as the peso oro sellado ("stamped gold peso"), a coin of 1.612 g of gold of fineness 900 (90%), and the silver peso, 25 g of silver of fineness 900.[5] Gold coins of 5 and 2.5 pesos were to be used, silver coins of one peso and 50, 20, 10 and 5 centavos, and copper coins of 2 and 1 centavos.

The Argentine Peso (ARS) is the currency unit for Argentina. The Peso symbol is the same as the dollar sign ($). The Peso is subdivided into centavos; 1 Peso = 100 centavos. The previous currency of Argentina was also called the Peso; however, the currency evolved and fewer zeros are currently being used.

The United States and Argentina have a shared interest in countering illicit financial activity, terrorism, and organized crime which present a serious threat to our respective people, businesses, and communities. The financial intelligence that FIUs collect and share is critical to these efforts. In addition to helping bring criminals to justice, financial intelligence provides key lead information that law enforcement officials proactively employ to prevent terrorist and other criminal activities from occurring in the first place. In signing this MOU, FinCEN and the UIF have committed to strengthening their information sharing capabilities to increase the effectiveness of this important work.

Through its International Operations, ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has 65 operational attaché offices in 46 countries around the world. HSI special agents work closely with foreign law enforcement agencies through a robust network of specialized, vetted units known as Transnational Criminal Investigative Units. Additionally, HSI brings personnel from host countries to the United States to train at the Department of Homeland Security Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.

In any case, if the project is finally launched, the road will be difficult. Sharing a currency implies losing monetary and exchange rate policy as macroeconomic stabilization tools at the national level. As Eurozone countries learned in the last decade, this can be painful, and therefore, it should be clear that there is a political project behind it that most citizens support without fissures. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, where attempts of political and economic integration have not gone as far as in Europe and nationalism is entrenched, this is far from clear. Even if the two countries were to link the real and the peso in the first phase, what would happen if Argentina were to devalue? How would this affect the credibility of the project? The Europeans also introduced the ECU (the European Currency Unit) in the 1980s, but the anchor of the European monetary system was always the German mark. And it took over 30 years for European countries to launch the euro, which is still a work in progress.

In short, the proposal for monetary integration between Argentina and Brazil seems to be to create a synthetic unit of account for financial and commercial trade, which would aim to reduce operational costs and isolate their economies from shock coming from U.S. monetary policy. If successful, this project could be a stepping stone toward a common currency that could reduce the intense dollarization of the region, especially acute in Argentina. Moreover, it shows that the arrival of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency in Brazil has the potential to trigger deeper economic integration in South America. However, the project is likely to fail. As the long and complex European experience shows, a monetary union cannot be sustained without a minimum degree of fiscal union that can cushion the asymmetric shocks that may impact the different parts of the union. If that is the ultimate objective, this is a project whose progress will be marked over decades and well beyond the terms of politicians currently in office.

The Argentina Peso has a monetary unit that follows a decimal system. Both the banknotes and coins are printed by the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. The coins are available in 7 denominations such as the following:

This entry provides the average annual price of a country's monetary unit for the time period specified, expressed in units of local currency per US dollar, as determined by international market forces or by official fiat. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 4217 alphabetic currency code for the national medium of exchange is presented in parenthesis. Closing daily exchange rates are not presented in The World Factbook, but are used to convert stock values - e.g., the market value of publicly traded shares - to US dollars as of the specified date.

From the end of World War II until the 1990s, Argentina vied with other South American countries and a few countries in otherparts of the world for the dubious honor of having the highestinflation rate in the world. As is always the case with rapidinflation, the price increase in Argentina was fueled by rapidexpansion of the money supply. The seigniorage earned from monetaryexpansion served the needs of the government as a method of taxationthat was difficult to avoid and politically easy to enact.

Argentina, like many other chronic-inflation economies, went through repeated cycles of hyperinflation followed by attempts at stabilization. A typical cycle in such an inflationary economy begins with acceleration of money creation to accommodate the government's budgetary needs. As inflation accelerates, political pressure to reduce inflation builds, leading to an eventual "monetary reform." Such reforms usually include the introduction of a new currency (which is convenient since inflation has usually moved the nominal prices of goods and services into the thousands, million, billions, or even trillions of units of the old currency) and promises on the part of the government (which is in charge of the budget) and the central bank (which is in charge of issuing money and is often under direct control of the government) to follow rules leading to slower monetary growth in the future.

These rules often take the form of monetaryrules, under which the central bank promises to keep the growthrate of the money supply within specified limits. Alternatively,countries sometimes promise to keep the foreign-exchange rate (theamount of the domestic currency it takes to buy one dollar in theforeign-exchange market) stable under a so-called exchange-raterule.A major difficulty that plagues anti-inflationreforms is credibility. Once inflationary expectations have becomeingrained in a society, people become very skeptical of governmentand central-bank promises to keep inflation under control. Thisskepticism leads them to maintain "defense mechanisms" against theeffects of inflation and the inflation tax.

Another common defense mechanism is theindexation of contracts and payments. This involves writinginto the contract an inflation-based adjustment of all nominalpayments to compensate for changes in the price level. Although thepresence of indexation is extremely valuable in helping an economylive with high inflation, it can contribute to an inertia that makesit more difficult for the central bank to reduce inflation. Undersome forms of indexed contracts, wages (or whatever payment isprovided for in the contract) may continue to rise for some periodafter inflation has stopped. This causes wage costs to continuerising and forces firms to continue to raise prices even after themonetary growth that was the root cause of inflation hasstopped.

By 1990, Argentina had been through almost adozen cycles of hyperinflation and reform. None of the reforms keptinflation low for more than a couple of years before a combination offiscal pressure and lack of credibility forced the central bank toabandon monetary restraint and crank up the printing press yet again.The public's attitude combined a desperate wish that inflation couldbe eliminated with a deep-seated cynicism about the prospects foreffective anti-inflationary policies.

In 1990, the government of president Carlos Menem and economics minister Domingo Cavallo embarked on a truly radical anti-inflationary reform: They adopted a straitjacket monetary system called a currency board. Under a currency board (which was also used routinely to manage the money supply of Hong Kong), every unit of the domestic currency (the peso, in Argentina's case) is backed by a corresponding number of units (one, for Argentina) of dollars or other foreign currencies in the central bank's vault. Only when more dollars flow into the central bank's coffers (as, for example, when the country runs a trade surplus) is the central bank allowed to expand the money supply. This eliminates the possibility of expanding the money supply for fiscal reasons. The Argentine central bank committed itself to exchanging dollars for pesos on a one-for-one basis; anyone who brought in a peso could receive a dollar in exchange.

A currency board eliminates any ability of thecentral bank to issue money voluntarily. Its main drawback is that itis impossible for monetary policy to respond to conditions in thedomestic economy such as recession or banking crises. However, aslong as it remains in force, the currency board makes sustainedinflation impossible.

In 1990, the government began to completelyoverhaul the organization of the Argentine economy. It included (a)comprehensive liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements,(b) the privatization of public enterprises and the deregulation ofthe economy, (c) reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus of thepublic sector and the reconstruction of the tax system, and (d) thecreation of a new monetary system. 041b061a72